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Long-Term Effects of the Demographic Transition on Family and Kinship Networks in Britain
Michael Murphy the first demographic transition started in many western industrialized societies around the latter part of the nineteenth century with steady mortality improvement. expectation of life at birth, about 40 years at the start of the transition, has now doubled (riley 2001). Fertility declined from a level of about five children to under two children per woman over the same period (Coale and watkins 1986; Chesnais 1993; dyson 2010) . this decline was interrupted in many industrialized countries by the baby boom and associated marriage boom in the post-world war ii period, peaking in the early 1960s. the decline resumed to such an extent that some countries experienced ultralow fertility, with total fertility rates below 1.3, together with very low rates of marriage (Billari and Kohler 2004; Frejka et al. 2008) . widespread signs of stabilization or reversal from these historically unprecedented low fertility levels only started to appear in the early twenty-first century (Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009) . these widespread fertility declines have led to population aging, initially resulting from reductions in fertility and more recently compounded by mortality improvement at older ages. while countries have shown some variations in the timing and magnitude, broadly similar trends are observed. trends in fertility and life expectancy for the country that is the subject of this chapter, england and wales (hereafter Britain), are shown in Figures 1a and 1b. this resumption of fertility decline in the second half of the twentieth century was associated with changes in partnership behavior in many countries that some consider to be a second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987; lesthaeghe 1995) , although this contention has been challenged, (e.g., Coleman 2005) . these changes included substantial reductions in marriage and increases in marital breakdown. nonmarital cohabitation became more common and increasing proportions of births occurred within cohabiting unions: by 2008, over half of births in countries such as Bulgaria, France, norway, Slovenia, and Sweden were outside marriage. Cohabiting unions tend to be more fragile than marriage; consequently increasing proportions of partnerships are ended by divorce or separation rather than death, leading to larger numbers of living former partners. Some of these changes in living and partnership arrangements are closely bound up with fertility developments. For example, availability of effective and acceptable contraception is an important factor in both fertility and partnership trends (murphy 1993) .
although the first demographic transition occurred in all western industrialized societies, the magnitude and timing varied. many countries experienced the first indications of fertility decline around the period 1880-1910, with the notable exception of an early starter, France (Coale and watkins 1986) . this decline was often followed by a period when marriage rates fell substantially, especially for women, which combined with the low fertility of marriages of the time (and relatively few extramarital births) meant that the family life of these groups differed substantially from that of cohorts on either side of them. For example, 16 percent of women married in england and wales in 1923-25 were still childless in 1946, and a further 25 percent had only one child (anderson 1998) . Because an additional 15-20 percent of women born around the end of the nineteenth century had not married by the end of their reproductive period, well over half of these cohorts had either one child or none (i.e., an average of less than 0.25 daughters per woman in this group).
these changes in fertility, mortality, and partnership clearly determined national population structures (e.g., lee 2003; mason and lee 2007), but the implications of these changes at the levels of families and kin groups have not been widely studied. in particular, demographic transition is usually analyzed in terms of period effects rather than cohort or generational effects, but period changes in demographic regimes may act differently across generations: for example, reduced fertility and mortality will simultaneously tend to increase the number of living grandparents a child has through improved survival, but reduce the number of living grandchildren older people have through lower fertility. demographic transition leads to certain types of kin becoming more common and others less so, with the emergence of a "beanpole" family structure (Bengston, rosenthal, and Burton 1990) in which individuals have more vertical links with their primary kin as they grow older but fewer links both with close horizontal kin such as siblings and with extended kin of all types. even individuals and families who were not directly involved in a particular demographic regime may nevertheless be affected by it. For example, persons born in the 1940s will have fewer grandchildren because of the recent very low fertility levels. in this chapter, i describe how the family and kin constellations of cohorts in Britain have changed between 1850 (just before the onset of the first demographic transition) and 2010-a date by which the consequences of the second demographic transition are affecting the wider demographic system. while information on co-resident groups, including families and households, is available from surveys and censuses and has been analyzed in detail (e.g. wall 2001; ruggles 2009), much less is known about non-co-resident kin. However, the increased propensity of people to live in separate households and the greater instability of family life mean that some types of family members outside the household are becoming more common and potentially more important. this chapter is concerned with such wider kinship and family networks, whether co-resident or not. the main indicator used is the estimated average number of people's living kin of various types at different ages and over the whole lifetime. i illustrate these estimates primarily through contour charts showing the ages at which the same average numbers of kin are found.
apart from information on marital status available in decennial censuses of england and wales since 1851, there are no direct estimates of any other type of living kin over extended time periods. as in most other countries, such estimates can be produced only by demographic modeling (although detailed information is beginning to emerge from sources such as the dutch kinship reconstitution project: van Poppel, monden, and mandemakers 2008) . the next section describes the microsimulation approach used, and subsequent sections present the results obtained and discuss the implications of the findings.
Methods and data
microsimulation is the principal method used to investigate long-term kinship patterns in demographic studies (wachter 1987 ruggles 1987; wolf 1994; reher 1997; Hammel 2005) . 1 in this application, an initial population of 40,000 with the population distribution of england in 1751 obtained from wrigley and Schofield (1981, table a.3.1) is modeled up to 2010. this population (excluding migration, although the demographic rates used here include overseas-born people) is subject to appropriate rates of fertility, mortality, and nuptiality (including divorce from 1850 and cohabitation from 1950) for the period since 1751. over time, a full set of kinship links is constructed as the individuals marry, procreate, and die, so that any kinship relationship through blood or partnership (married or cohabiting) may be traced through living and/or dead kin. the entire kinship network of any group of people depends only on their own and their ancestors' fertility, mortality, and nuptiality; hence, if these values are known exactly, their kin universes can be determined precisely.
For each type of kinship relationship, the relevant kin of each living member of the simulation population ("egos") at various time points were identified. it is then possible to calculate summary measures such as the average number of various types of kin by blood or marriage and the proportion of those in a given age group who have one or more of the relevant kin type according to measures such as generational relationship (older, same, or younger) and genetic closeness to a particular individual. i concentrate on close kin including grandparents, aunts and uncles, and first cousins. the networks of living kin of people at every age for each five-year cohort over the period 1850-2010 were estimated (as summarized in table 1). Such estimates cannot replicate the exact patterns over this period since they do not model the fine detail of population inter-relationships: for example, the rates used are ten-year averages and the probability of divorce in this model depends on duration of marriage, but does not depend on number of children born or age at marriage, both of which affect divorce propensity (ruggles 1987). (Coale and watkins 1986; Coleman 1996; Sklar 1974; ehmer 2002) . in analyses of the number of living children, little information is lost by combining males and females, but men and women have exhibited different partnership patterns over time. direct information on marital status, available from Censuses of Population since 1851, are used here.
2 two key indicators of marriage are shown: whether the individual is currently married or has ever been married (information on cohabitation is not available in censuses before 1991). the proportions of men and women currently married at a given age are broadly similar (as would be expected given the relatively small average spousal age difference) apart from the early twentieth century when sex ratios were particularly unbalanced. However, the experience of being ever-married has differed substantially between men and women. marriage rates for women were particularly low in the 1920s and 1930s, for reasons including shortages of men following world war i and poor economic conditions at the time. By contrast, in the period from 1945 to about 1970 many countries experienced an unprecedented marriage boom, with higher proportions marrying and at earlier ages than in any earlier or later period in history. the highest proportions of women ever-and currently married are found among the cohorts born circa 1940, who were in the prime ages for marriage when marriage rates peaked in the late 1960s (see Figures 2a and 2b). in this age group, 13 out of 14 women had been married by age 30, and two thirds were still married at age 65 (see Figures 2c and 2d) .
3 in contrast to women, the experiences of marriage for men born around 1940 were not substantially different from those of men born earlier. the highest proportions married among working-age men were found for those born about 1910, with over 85 percent currently married between their late 30s and early 60s. Historically, the proportion of males who never married was lower than that for women; and while men also experienced the 1960s marriage boom, the variability in experience of marriage has been much greater for women than for men over time.
this marriage boom was followed by a sharp decline in the propensity to marry and to remain married, and the proportions currently married at young ages are much lower for the youngest cohorts shown. of all cohorts born since at least the start of the nineteenth century, and very probably in all earlier periods as well, those born around 1940 are likely to be the most advantaged in terms of having a living partner at ages beyond 60, because their higher marriage rates and improved mortality have not been offset by the much higher divorce rates found among later cohorts. in the past, the proportions married at older ages differed substantially between the sexes since men experienced higher mortality and were older on average than their wives, but these differences are lessening. reduced mortality, recently most marked among men, has an increasingly prominent impact on the likelihood of having a spouse at older ages, especially for women. Consequently the proportion of women who are widowed is decreasing, a trend that is expected to continue (Kalogirou and murphy 2006) .
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Vertical kin: Natural parents and children, and grandparents and grandchildren together with partners (who, by definition, are likely to live together), the most important kin relationship is that of parents and children, who often provide the most contact and support for each other (Segalen 2003; Grundy and murphy 2006) . Half of those providing care to older people are children, compared with just under half who are spouses/partners (euroFamCare consortium 2006, table 59). although there must be at least one child and one parent in any parent-child relationship, the overall trends for average number of living children and living parents differ (see Figures 3a and 3b ). infant and child mortality had a considerable impact in the past, but mortality in contemporary developed societies, especially among young adults, is so low that the number of surviving adult children remains relatively constant once childbearing is complete. therefore a cohort's average number of surviving children largely reflects its own fertility patterns (murphy, martikainen, and Pennec 2006). the highest values are found among cohorts who were bearing children in the higher-fertility period before world war i, with a secondary peak among cohorts born around 1940 whose childbearing was centered in the mid-1960s baby boom, but with lower values for cohorts born in the early decades of the twentieth century and from the 1950s (Figure 3a) . the trend for adults having living parents is much steadier for these cohorts than for the reverse relationship. there was only a comparatively small increase over time in the average number of parents alive at any given age for cohorts born in the first half of the period covered (Figure 3b )-all that matters is the parental age at childbearing and parental survival beyond that age. mortality at older ages showed little improvement initially, but a steady improvement was seen for cohorts in the second half of the period, and the average number of parents alive started to increase substantially. about one quarter of persons born circa 1860 had lost at least one parent by age ten, whereas this fraction was not reached until over age 30 for persons born a century later.
the median age for having at least one living parent (i.e., the age at which 50 percent have a living parent) increased nearly as much in the last 25 years, from 49 to 55 years, as in the previous 100 years, from about 43 to 49 years (murphy 2010a). mortality improvement has been the most significant determinant of increased numbers of living parents, although this trend is likely to be reversed in decades to come as the effect of increasing ages at childbearing outweighs likely improvements in mortality (murphy, martikainen, and Pennec 2006) . the average number of living parents of young children has been more variable over time: apart from different mortality experiences, another reason is that children born outside of a partnership in this model do not have a known father, so they have a maximum of one pos- sible living parent. 5 therefore the increase in adult mortality in the world war ii period, together with the sharp rise in extramarital births around that time, led to the smaller average number of living parents of the 1940-45 cohorts, and the latter factor is responsible for lower average numbers of living parents in the most recent cohorts.
the importance of grandparents for family functioning, especially in areas such as provision of childcare, has recently been emphasized (Segalen 2003; department of Health 2010) . many of the points made regarding the patterns and determinants of trends in parent/child kinship ties are also relevant to discussion of grandparent/grandchild kinship trends, possibly magnified since links across two generations rather than one are involved. Cohorts born at the start of the nineteenth century 6 had an average of just under ten living grandchildren around age 75 (when their children's fertility was largely complete), but this number fell steadily as the lower fertility of the two generations involved reduced the number to just under four at present for the 1930s cohorts. Persons born in the middle of the nineteenth century had only six living grandchildren on average since they and, in particular, their children had lower fertility than earlier cohorts (see Figure  4a ). However, a temporary reversal occurred for the early 1940s cohorts. although completed fertility of both generations has the major effect on age at grandparenthood, changing age at parenthood is also significant: for example, to be a grandparent at age 60 requires that the ages at first birth averaged over two successive generations are under 30 years. the 1940s cohorts had the youngest average age at first birth of all cohorts considered here, and maternal grandmothers have the lowest ages of attaining grandparenthood given women's younger average age at birth of children than that of men. the median age of grandparenthood (the age at which half of parents had at least one living grandchild) was just over 55 in 2000, nearly ten years lower than in 1950, but this lower age is likely to become less common, especially for men, and grandparenthood will occur later in the future (murphy 2010b).
one of the consequences of mortality improvement is that intergenerational relationship ties spanning more than one generation become more common. in the first half of the period considered, a child aged under five was likely to have an average of just over two grandparents alive (mainly grandmothers), but this had risen to about 3.5 by 2010 (see Figure 4b) . Children today have an average of at least three living grandparents for most of their childhood. the implications of mortality improvement for adults having grandparents alive are even more substantial. up to 1950 half of those at age 20 had no living grandparent, whereas in 2000 this 50 percent level was not reached until after age 30, at which age the proportion of people with at least one grandparent alive was double the proportion even 25 years earlier.
Brothers and sisters
Siblings are the next most important blood kin relationship after parents and children, with the same genetic relationship between full siblings as between parents and children, and usually an extended period of co-residence in childhood. Figure 5 shows the number of living siblings (both full, i.e., those with both natural parents in common; and half, i.e., those with only one in common). Changes in numbers of siblings indicate some of the most substantial consequences of the progression of the first demographic transition. numbers of ever-born siblings remained high through the nineteenth century, and even cohorts born around 1880 had eight ever-born siblings on average, but the number of living siblings was reduced substantially because of death (murphy 2010a). the decline in fertility from the end of the nineteenth century led to a sharp drop in average number of ever-born siblings, but this was offset by mortality improvement in the twentieth century, with about two thirds of the siblings of persons born around 1900 still alive at age 50.
the figure of around eight ever-born siblings for persons born in the second half of the nineteenth century is considerably higher than the total fertility rates for this period (Figure 1 ). this sibship size reflects the fact that there were relatively high proportions of childless women, and average family size was therefore higher among the childbearing population, also, in the calculation of average sibship sizes, the size is computed for each child, hence giving greater weight to large families-unlike the case for calculations of average family size 7 (Preston 1976; lam and marteleto 2008) . Preston (1976, p. 111) pointed out that, to keep fertility rates constant, people must always bear on average substantially fewer children than were born into their own family of orientation. But in the past the number of their living siblings was much smaller than their number of ever-born siblings, so the social consequences arising from being from a large family may be much smaller than numbers of ever-born siblings suggest. at the start of the period analyzed, the average number of living siblings of a new-born child was about one third of the ever-born figure; all of the cohorts shown had fewer than three living siblings on average at birth. the reasons for this are that the average birth order will be only about half of final sibship size, and the high mortality of the period (about 15 percent of children died before their first birthday and 27 percent by age five in the mid-nineteenth century in Britain) meant that some of the previously born siblings would have died before the birth of later-born children. the largest average number of living siblings, just over five, was found among teenagers for the 1850s to 1870s cohorts, and that figure remained relatively stable for the early working-age years because mortality among young adults was relatively low. Because average family sizes of women in the nineteenth century were four to five children (but higher for married women), women did not have fewer children on average than the number of siblings they were brought up with (i.e., their own average number of living siblings).
the number of living siblings is determined by two factors: the distributions of fertility and cohort mortality. although the childhood experiences of these groups over this 160-year period, as reflected in ever-born sibship size (and to a lesser extent in number of living siblings), are so different, living sibship sizes are much more similar at older ages. at about age 65, all cohorts have an average of about two living siblings, declining to about one at age 85 ( Figure 5 ). therefore the improvement in mortality over this period means that by age 85 all cohorts have similar average numbers of living siblings in all time periods, even though those born later had much smaller average numbers of siblings when they were children. Half of those in their early 80s have at least one living sibling, considerably more than have a living spouse. only children are clearly the sole group who cannot potentially have a living sibling, and the frequency of such families will affect the proportions without siblings. although information on family size distributions in Britain for persons born before the 1920s birth cohorts is sparse, relatively few children were brought up in one-child families (anderson 1998).
Other close relatives: Nephews and nieces, aunts and uncles, and first cousins the diminishing role of extended kin has been a major topic in the debate about modernization and changing family roles (murphy 2008) . around the time of the onset of sustained mortality decline in the mid-nineteenth century (murphy 2010c), the contribution of non-nuclear kin became greater as industrialization and urbanization stimulated migration, especially among young adults, who would often look to relatives for assistance and accom- , table 2) shows that the average number of relatives other than members of the nuclear family living in households remained largely constant for the next century before falling substantially only in the second half of the twentieth century. i now consider the closest types of non-nuclear (or "secondary") kinnephews and nieces, aunts and uncles, and first cousins. the number of such kin depends on variables such as sibship sizes and number of children, and on the correlation in fertility between both spouses and children and their parents. Children are disproportionally born to kin groups who have higher fertility in general (murphy and wang 2001; murphy and Knudsen 2002) . the number of ever-born nephews and nieces dropped sharply following fertility decline, so that the number of living nephews and nieces among adults around age 60 has fallen by about one half to a value of six over the period covered here, even though later cohorts experienced lower mortality.
while cohorts have increasing average numbers of parents alive over time as mortality improves, the number of their living parents' siblingsaunts and uncles-shows divergent patterns with age since fertility is also important. among people aged over about 45 years, the average number of living aunts and uncles generally increases over time; but at around age 40, the value of about four aunts and uncles remains relatively constant over the whole period, and it declines at younger ages. until the cohorts of the 1940s, a child had an average of about ten aunts and uncles at birth, whereas the figure for those born at the start of twenty-first century is about one third less.
of the types of living relatives discussed here, the highest average numbers are of first cousins. Persons born in the nineteenth century had more than 25 first cousins for most of their working lives, but this number had fallen by two thirds for the youngest cohorts shown. However, this change only starts to have a substantial impact for those born after about 1930.
Conclusions and implications
a convenient way of summarizing the changing kinship ties of various cohorts is to show the average number of kin people have throughout their lives. Figure 6 shows the average number of kin from birth (age 15 in the case of marriage data, children, and nephews/nieces; and age 45 for grandchildren since values are close to zero below these ages) to age 85 for persons who had typical kinship networks consistent with the cohort's mortality experience. over time, the average number of kin among older generations (including aunts and uncles) increased, but numbers of the same or later generations declined, apart from number of grandchildren which remains relatively constant for cohorts born from around 1870. Figure 7 presents information on the experience of selected cohorts over the century by showing the total numbers of kin subdivided into various major types. two main dimensions are presented. the first is whether a relative is a member of an older generation (parents, aunts, etc.), same generation (siblings, first cousins, etc.), or younger generation (children, nephews, etc.) than the individual ("ego") concerned. the second is the closeness of the relationship. in practice, more-distant kin play a less important role in family functioning than closer kin, although numerically first cousins are by far the largest group considered here. therefore the relationship results were weighted by genetic closeness to give a measure of "equivalent close kin." the weighting is based on the degree of genetic relatedness between the ego and the relative. For the closest set of relatives considered-mothers, 
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parents, children, and siblings, who have half of their genes in common with ego on average-the weight is set at one. egos have one quarter in common with aunts, uncles, nephews, nieces, grandparents, and grandchildren; and one eighth in common with first cousins. while this weighting is arbitrary, it reflects the greater importance of close kin, so weights are 0.5 and 0.25 respectively. the maximum total weighted number of kin analyzed here occurs around age 40 for all cohorts. the value for persons born in 1850 is about 22 "equivalent close kin," but this figure drops to 15 for those born in 1950 (see Figure 7a ). the balance of kin types of by generation also changes over time. a 40-year-old in the 1950 cohort has approximately equal numbers of kin in the older, same, and younger generations. For the 1850 cohort, in contrast, about half of kin at this age were in a younger generation, and relatively few were in an older generation. turning now to the numbers of close and more-distant kin, the number of primary kin-referring here to parents, children, siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren-dropped by just under one third, slightly less proportionately than the overall value (see Figure 7b) . the distributions by type of relative in the first half of the study period tend to be similar, but for those born around 1950, grandparents form a larger fraction of kin of young people and siblings form a much smaller fraction, whereas for the middle age ranges, the increase in numbers of living parents starts to become substantial.
numbers of secondary kin decline somewhat more than primary kin over this period, but even so, the decline is less than 40 percent at most ages. in the first half century considered, the main change was a reduction in numbers of such kin, but in the second half the distribution of kin changed, with nephews/nieces and first cousins forming a much smaller fraction of the total number of (weighted) secondary kin (see Figure 7c) . as in Figure 6 , these data show some reductions in the proportions of kin of the same generation and increases especially in older generations, 8 as suggested by the image of the beanpole family. while this pattern is beginning to emerge, the proportions of kin who are of the same generation do not appear to have changed greatly over the period, and the main feature shown is an increase in the number of kin in older generations compared to those in younger generations.
Kin availability is particularly sensitive to long-term population trends. many of the changes arising from the demographic transition have been more pronounced in the second half of the twentieth century than in earlier periods. in part, this is because declines in fertility and mortality are long-term processes, but it is also the case that the kin pool is generated by long-term trends often occurring before the individuals concerned were born. whether one has a living grandparent or grandchild is determined by fertility, mortality, and nuptiality over a period close to a century. For instance, the demographic transition is only now starting to lose its impact on availability of some types of kin, and its effects were still clearly visible in the 1950s in determining numbers of siblings of older people. Population aging, now underway in most industrialized societies, will have two main impacts on kin relations, apart from changing the availability of particular kin as a result of changing age structures. the first is an aging of generational relationships: events that formerly occurred early in life now usually occur later in life, such as the experience of one's parents' deaths, or are likely to do so in the future, such as the age at which one becomes a grandparent. the second is that patterns of re-partnering will lead to more partial relationships involving stepparents, half siblings, former partners, and stepchildren.
Appendix in the SoCSim model, in any month, each individual has a chance of experiencing a vital event such as becoming a parent, forming or dissolving a partnership, or dying, by generating a random variable that gives the correct probability of the event occurring. Cohabitation is also included from 1950 when it started to become numerically significant.
the SoCSim model is closed (watcher 1987) so that partners have to be found within the existing un-partnered simulation population. the model does not include any socioeconomic covariates since only national values are available in the historical data that the model uses.
the main addition to the updated version of the original SoCSim model here is the inclusion of an extended set of options to incorporate heterogeneity in demographic behavior, assortative mating for demographic characteristics, and intergenerational transmission of demographic behaviors. the importance of such features was stressed by ruggles (1987, 1993) . Further details are given in murphy and wang (2002) and murphy (2006) . Such models cannot replicate the exact patterns over this period since they do not model the fine detail of population inter-relationships. they use realistic but simplified assumptions that give output values acceptably similar to observed values (murphy 2010a). Comparisons between actual and model values for fertility and mortality are shown in Figure 1 .
SoCSim is designed to analyze the evolution of long-run historical populations and therefore requires vital rates over extended time periods. in the period up to 1850, information on fertility, mortality, and nuptiality in Britain is drawn from unpublished estimates provided by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. Following the introduction of national vital registration in 1837, this source was used for rates from 1850. more detailed fertility rates by age, marital status, and parity were found to be necessary from 1950. they were constructed using additional information from surveys such as the General Household Survey (office for national Statistics 2009), which was also used to estimate cohabitation rates. demographic factors such as fertility, age at first birth, nuptiality, and marital breakdown are partially inherited at the family level (mcGue and lykken 1992; dunne et al. 1997; Kohler, rodgers, and Christensen 1999; murphy 1999) . in addition, different patterns by various social groups will lead to intergenerational correlations (ruggles 1993). in this model, the correlation in fertility between parents and children is about 0.2 since 1871, in line with observed values (murphy and wang 2002) . this means that the demographic behaviors of kin group members, such as siblings, will also be positively correlated. ruggles (1993) concluded that the main impact of inclusion or exclusion of correlated behavior within kin groups was on variability rather than the mean values presented here. after the 260 years for which the simulation is run, the total number of living people in the simulation population had risen from the initial 40,000 to 262,000 (the total simulation population size including deceased members is 855,000 by 2010, table 1). the values are smaller than those in murphy (2010a) since the level of fertility assumed in the early nineteenth century is lower.
For each type of kinship relationship, the relevant kin of each living member of the simulation population ("egos") at various time points were identified. For example, in the case of first cousins, all pairs of members of the simulated population with at least one grandparent in common were identified. in the model as formulated, births outside a partnership do not identify the father; therefore individuals with incomplete genealogies were excluded. For the 25 million such pairs identified, it is possible to calculate the average number of living first cousins, and similarly for other relationships.
Notes
Figures in this chapter are available in color in the electronic edition of the volume.
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1 this analysis uses an updated version of the Berkeley SoCSim demographic microsimulation model (Hammel et al. 1976; Hammel, mason, and wachter 1990) . the program is freely available and written in standard anSi C, and runs on uniX/linux operating systems («http://www.demog. berkeley.edu/~socsim/»). the SoCSim model is briefly described in the appendix, and further details are available from the author on request (m.murphy@lse.ac.uk).
2 these data are available only in fiveyear or longer intervals every ten years, so it was necessary to adjust the data to produce single-year-of-age estimates for each year.
3 these data do not include proportions cohabiting, but evidence suggests the numbers in earlier periods were small (murphy 2000) . the recent increase in cohabitation has been insufficient to offset the decline in marriage, so that overall proportions of young people in partnerships have declined (Berrington and murphy 1994) . 4 one group that has started to increase in the last half century and will continue to do so is persons with living former partners following cohabitation breakdown or divorce. this increase is linked in part to the second demographic transition, but the long-standing high uS divorce rates suggest other factors also operate. the analysis here indicates that the numbers in this group were trivial in Britain before 1950 since they arose from the relatively rare event of divorce. By 2000, however, about 20 percent of persons aged between the late 20s and mid-60s have a living former partner (murphy 2010a).
5 analyses with such cases excluded are available on request (m.murphy@lse.ac.uk).
6 no national-level fertility data are available until the introduction of a vital registration system in 1837, and even then only limited information on fertility is available until well into the twentieth century. the early estimates should therefore be treated cautiously. ancestors such as the grandparents of those alive in the nineteenth century would have come from earlier cohorts close to the start of the simulation period when the vital registration system was incomplete, so values for such groups are not shown for early cohorts. 7 the figure of eight ever-born siblings is almost identical to one calculated from the maternity data collected in the 1911 Census of england and wales for completed fertility of married women, which relates to births around the same period (registrar General 1923; murphy 2010b).
8 although not considered here, there is also a substantial increase in multi-generational kin groups. Proportions with great-grandparents are a particularly rapidly increasing group, although from a low base.
